Certificate Transparency (29 Nov 2011)
(I don't have comments on this blog, but you can comment on my Google+ post.)
Ben Laurie and I have been working on a longer term plan for improving the foundations of the certificate infrastructure on which most Internet transport security is based on these days. Although Chrome has public key pinning for some domains, which limits the set of permitted certificates, we don't see public key pinning as a long term solution (and nor was it ever designed to be).
For the 10 second summary of the plan, I'll quote Ben: “certificates are registered in a public audit log. Servers present proofs that their certificate is registered, along with the certificate itself. Clients check these proofs and domain owners monitor the logs.”. I would add only that anyone can check the logs: the certificate infrastructure would be fully transparent.
We now have an outline of the basic idea and will be continuing to flesh it out in the coming months, hopefully in conjunction with other browser vendors.
But I thought that, at the outset, it would be helpful to describe some of the limitations to the design space, as I see them:
As I've previously described, side-channels occur when a browser needs to contact a server other than the immediate destination in order to verify a certificate. Revocation checking with OCSP is an example of a side-channel used today.
But in order to be effective, side-channels invariably need to block the certificate verification until they complete, and that's a big problem. The Internet isn't fully connected. Captive portals, proxies and firewalls all mean that the only thing you can really depend on talking to is the immediate destination server. Because of this, browsers have never been able to make OCSP lookups blocking, and therefore OCSP is basically useless for security.
And that's not to mention the privacy, performance and functionality issues that arise from needing side-channels. (What happens when the side-channel server goes down?)
So our design requires that the servers send us the information that we require. We can use side-channels to check up on the logs, but it's an asynchronous lookup.
It's not opt-in, it's all-in
SSL Stripping is a very easy and very effective attack. HSTS prevents it and is as easy to deploy as anything can be for HTTPS sites. But, despite all this, and despite a significant amount of evangelism, take up has been very limited, even by sites which are HTTPS only and the subject of attacks.
While HSTS really has to be opt-in, a solution to the certificate problem doesn't. Although our scheme is incrementally deployable, the eventual aim is that it's required for everybody. Thankfully, since certificates have to be renewed there's an obvious means to incrementally deploy it: require it for certificates issued after a certain date. Although an eventual hard requirement is still needed, it's a lot less of a problem.
It's easy on the server operator
Since the aim is to make it a requirement for all servers, we've sacrificed a lot in order to make it very easy on the server operator. For most server operators, their CA will probably take care of fetching the audit proofs, meaning there's no additional work at all.
Some initial designs included short-lived log signatures, which would have solved the revocation problem. (Revocation would simply be a matter of instructing the logs to stop signing a given certificate.) However, this would have required server operators to update their audit proofs on a near-daily basis. After discussions it became clear that such a requirement wouldn't be tenable for many and so we reluctantly dropped it.
We are also sacrificing decentralisation to make things easy on the server. As I've previously argued, decentralisation isn't all it's cracked up to be in most cases because 99.99% of people will never change any default settings, so we haven't given up much. Our design does imply a central set of trusted logs which is universally agreed. This saves the server from possibly having to fetch additional audit proofs at runtime, something which requires server code changes and possible network changes.
There are more valid certificates than the one that's currently serving
Cheap virtual hosting and EC2 have made multi-homed services common. Even small to medium scale sites have multiple servers these days. So any scheme that asserts that the currently serving certificate is the only valid certificate will run into problems when certificates change. Unless all the servers are updated at exactly the same time, then users will see errors during the switch. These schemes also make testing a certificate with a small number of users impossible.
In the end, the only real authority on whether a certificate is valid is the site itself. So we don't rely on external observations to decide on whether a certificate is valid, instead to seek to make the set of valid certificates for a site public knowledge (which it currently isn't), so that the site can determine whether it's correct.
It's not easy to do
We believe that this design will have a significant, positive impact on an important part of Internet security and that it's deployable. We also believe that any design that shares those two properties ends up looking a lot like it. (It's no coincidence that we share several ideas with the EFF's Sovereign Keys.)
None the less, deployment won't be easy and, hopefully, we won't be pushing it alone.