We've supported DNSSEC stapled certificates in Chrome for a while now and since the DANE RFC has been published, it's about time that I updated that code to support DANE, rather than the hacked up CAA record that it currently uses.
I've written the DANE code, but it also seemed like an opportune time to reevaluate the idea. The promise of DNSSEC, as Dan Kaminsky put it, it that it can reduce the number of meetings required to get something done.
You have a whole bunch of internal hosts that some company that you're partnering with needs to interface with securely? Well, perhaps you used an internal CA, so will they install that root on their systems? (Meeting.) They will if it's name constrained, can we get it reissued with name constraints? (Meeting.) Ok, now can IT get that root pushed out everywhere? (Meeting.) You see how this is going.
But every bit of code needs to justify its complexity and, for small cases, StartSSL will give you free certificates. Perhaps just Chrome doing it isn't very interesting, and everyone hacks up custom solutions anyway.
So, if it's useful to you, you should let me know (agl at chromium dot org).