A blog post aggregating complaints about OpenID has been popping up in different places this morning. If you've read it, you might want a little perspective. I'm not going to deal with each point in turn because there's so many, mostly repeating each other.
At login time, the site that you're logging into can end up redirecting you to your OpenID provider. Your provider then tells you to go to their site and enter your login information, then click a button to try again. They don't provide a "link" to their site and they don't ask for your password.
Some early providers might not have followed these basic steps, but all the reasonable ones do.
Yes, it's still possible for users to be confused but, by habit they'll be used to doing to right thing.
XSS and CSRF
XSS problems on the providers site are a big deal. This criticism is reasonable.
CSRF may be a bigger deal because you are more likely to be 'logged in' to the target. However, most users already keep persistent cookies to save logging into these sites. The additional attack surface here is dubious; CSRF issues are a problem with or without OpenID.
If your OpenID starts with https://, you should be protected from DNS poisoning attacks and the like by the usual TLS PKI. This isn't perfect, but it's pretty good.
However, the OpenID spec says that plain domain names are normalised by prepending http://. This is a technical problem with the spec and should be fixed. Until then, this is a reasonable criticism but not a fundamental issue.
The OpenID provider has a lot of information about your activities. This is little different than, say, your email account and many people are happy with Gmail. Likewise, password recovery on most of the sites which could use OpenID is based on email access, so most people already have a single password that suffices for entry to many sites.
If you don't like the idea of Gmail you can run your own email server. Likewise, you can run your own OpenID provider.
Using the same OpenID on many sites does allow them to link your activities. So does giving these sites your email address for password recovery. So does using the same IP (although to a lesser extent).
Some providers will let you have many OpenIDs linked to the same account for this reason. Joe user probably won't use that feature and probably gives the same email address to all those sites already and so looses nothing.
OpenID is not a trust system. Trust systems may be built on top of identity systems. Likewise, apples are not oranges and complaints about their lack of tangyness are moot.
Usability / Adoption
Somewhat valid points here. It's a big job to get widespread adoption and, at the moment, it's a pretty small crowd that uses OpenID. However, OpenID doesn't need a flag day; it can have incremental deployment.
Valid points. If your provider goes down you're going to have a bad day.
I don't believe that OpenID should be used to login to your bank account. However, for the myriad of sites that I login to (Google Reader, reddit, ...) it would be nice to just be able to type my OpenID in. It's decently suited to that because I'm fed up with all these accounts.